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In the modern welfare state, people who cannot make a living usually receive financial 
assistance from public funds. Accordingly, the so-called social work norm against living off 
other people is violated, which may be the reason why the unemployed are so unhappy. If so, 
however, labour market concepts based on the notion of promoting low-paid jobs that are 
subsidised if necessary with additional payments would appear far less favourable. It could be 
that people are employed, but still unhappy. Using German panel data, this paper examines 
the relevance of the social work norm and finds a significant disutility effect of living off 
public funds. Although this is true for employed people as well, the results show that the 
individual is generally better off having a job that requires additional assistance, than having 
no job at all. On the other hand, such policies as the recent German labour market reforms can 




“We have established a functioning low-wage sector, and, in terms of social benefits, we have 
placed special emphasis on incentives to take up employment.” 
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For many countries, unemployment is one of the most pressing social problems. In the 
ongoing debate on the most promising policies in this context, economic advice focuses 
mainly on the real wage and its determinants. In line with the classical labour market model, 
in which wages above equilibrium levels lead to a labour surplus, the point is made that 
falling real wages can stimulate the demand for labour and reduce unemployment. However, 
even if not induced consciously by a particular labour market concept, large low-wage sectors 
are a reality in a number of countries. In contrast, there is widespread consensus that the 
community should ensure the minimum income needed to exist, at least for those who are not 
simply refusing to work. Given these facts, it is not surprising that, for many labour market 
economists, the design of low-wage sectors is seen as a fundamental economic challenge. 
Typically, proposals are based on the notion that individuals earning less than the subsistence 
level should receive additional payments from public funds. This financial support can be 
paid directly or indirectly, such as via tax credits. Yet, although such concepts have indeed 
been implemented in some cases, the viability of the economic advice is often refuted. 
Laymen and researchers, mostly from non-economic disciplines, are sceptical of 
supplementing earned income with taxpayer money. In Germany, for instance, a heated 
debate developed during the implementation of the recent labour market reforms, especially 
on the issue of the low-wage sector. Critics argue that too many people in Germany cannot 
make a living from their work, which they believe is particularly unacceptable for those 
working full-time. It is claimed that economists do not understand the true nature of the 
problem when people live off public funds entirely or in part and not from their own (earned) 
income. 
The disagreement over how to arrange the labour market is surely related to the particular 
perspective. Traditionally, economists have a rather pecuniary view, but rarely distinguish 
between different kinds of income, although the number of researchers refuting the notion that 
“income is income” (Moffitt, 1983, p.  1024) might be growing. Indeed, if people aim at 
earning their own living, so as to avoid depending on others, they do in fact distinguish 
between different sources of income. The corresponding belief that it is not right to live off 
public funds, which induces pressure to earn one’s own living, is referred to as the social 
work norm and has been introduced to economics over the past years. In reference to the 
philosopher and social scientist Elster (1989a), this social norm against living off others has 
  2been used primarily to explain the occurrence of multiple unemployment equilibria. 
Economic researchers, such as Stutzer and Lalive (2004) or Kolm (2005), argue that regional 
unemployment interacts with the pressure on the affected individual to comply with such a 
norm, resulting in “weak norm” and “strong norm” communities, with correspondingly 
different levels of unemployment. Apart from this argument, however, the relevance of the 
social work norm to labour market economics and policy-making has not yet been considered 
comprehensively, despite the important implications to be drawn simply from its existence 
and the probable consequences of people suffering psychologically from a dependency on 
benefits. 
Therefore, instead of simply assuming the existence of the social work norm, this paper 
argues that its relevance first needs to be confirmed, and that this can be achieved by an 
empirical investigation of the impact on well-being of receiving social benefits.
1 The logical 
connection is that if there is a normative pressure to earn one’s income from work, people 
who fail to conform would presumably suffer psychologically from the fact that they are 
living off other people.
2 These potential disutility effects can be measured by using the 
happiness research approach, which applies reported subjective well-being as an 
approximation of individual utility levels (see e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2005; Frey, 2008; van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008). 
While happiness research has shown convincingly that unemployment makes people unhappy, 
researchers have not yet answered the question of why this is so (Winkelmann, 2009, 
p. 429).
3 Therefore, one of the research objectives of this paper is to find out whether 
unhappiness from not conforming to the social work norm is the true reason for 
unemployment-induced disutility.
4 Hence, if there is a norm-induced impact on well-being, 
demonstrating the relevance of the social work norm, the next step is to compare both 
potential sources of unhappiness with one another, that is unemployment and benefit 
dependency. Furthermore, if non-conformity also exerts a happiness-reducing impact on 
employed people, this would have strong implications for labour market concepts based on 
the notion of promoting low-paid jobs that are subsidised if necessary with additional 
benefits. It could be that people are employed, but still unhappy. Finally, the use of German 
                                                 
1 As an example, in probably the first economic contribution on the social norm of living off one’s own work, 
referring to the original definition from Elster, the assumption is made that “the existence of such a social norm 
is taken as given” (Lindbeck et al., 1996, p. 2). 
2 Note that, for reasons of simplicity, and in accordance with the original definition of the social work norm, the 
term “living off other people” is used throughout the paper, despite its negative connotations. 
3 The Clark and Oswald (1994) article “Unhappiness and Unemployment” is not the first, but certainly the most 
well-known economic contribution in this context. For a list of studies, see Carroll (2007, p. 299). 
4 In this context, Carroll (2007, p. 288) conjectures “that norms about work […] are key drivers of the non-
pecuniary unemployment costs.” 
  3panel data from 1999 to 2008 allows a closer look at the interaction between such labour 
market policies and the potential effects of living off other people. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on the social 
work norm and related labour market issues. Section 3 presents the empirical investigation, 
while Section  4 gives a discussion of the results, aimed at potential policy implications. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Social Work Norm and the Labour Market  
The issue of social norms has long been ignored by economists. Yet, over the past decades, 
scepticism towards their relevance and measurability has diminished, so that social norms 
have found their way into theoretical models (e.g. Akerlof, 1980; Lindbeck,  1997; Azar, 
2004; Sliwka, 2007) and into a series of empirical investigations (e.g. Goerke and 
Pannenberg, 2004; Heinemann, 2008; Torgler et al., 2009; Halla et al., 2010), including 
studies using experimental methods (e.g. Fehr et al., 1998; Alm et al., 1999). Since 
interdisciplinarity and behavioural approaches have become common practice, increasing 
numbers of economists feel uneasy about leaving the issue of social norms to other disciplines 
such as sociology. Although there is now a large and continuously growing body of economic 
research, the measurement of social norms remains a challenge. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Young, 2008) characterises social norms as 
customary rules which affect the behaviour of individuals and thereby coordinate social 
interactions. This can lead to uniform behaviour within social groups, the more the rule is 
established and the more people expect others to conform. Since these expectations and the 
establishment of rules are in most cases very different, the adherence to norms often varies 
substantially between social groups. Elster (1989b) characterises social norms similarly, 
pointing out that they must be shared and sustained by other people, through their approval 
and disapproval, as well as by feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame in the 
event of norm-violation. 
Without doubt, a variety of social norms are potentially relevant to many different sectors of 
the economy, including the labour market. In his article on the significance of social norms to 
economic theory, Elster (1989b) lists a number of examples. As an instance of a work norm, 
he defines a behavioural regularity that Stutzer and Lalive (2004) refer to as the social work 
norm: “There is a social norm against living off other people and a corresponding normative 
pressure to earn one's income from work.” (Elster, 1989a, p. 121) This particular phenomenon 
  4was introduced to economics in the mid-1990’s to explain multiple equilibria, mostly in the 
labour market.
5 The argument is that there are regional differences in unemployment levels, 
which correlate with normative pressure to conform to such a norm and thus the varied degree 
of adherence to it. If more people violate the norm of earning one’s own income, such 
emotions as embarrassment and anxiety should decline, because it is more socially acceptable 
to live off public funds. As stated above, people tend to conform to informal rules when they 
expect their peers to do so as well. Depending on the level of norm-conformity, social 
interactions in a specific region determine the conviction that people should earn their own 
income and therefore, in turn, determine the non-pecuniary costs of failing to comply with the 
social work norm. Since the regional strength of norm adherence also affects unemployment 
levels, this relationship contributes to explaining different unemployment equilibria in 
otherwise similar communities (Kolm, 2005).  
By focusing on norm-guided behaviour and the corresponding beliefs, a direct measurement 
of the social work norm is certainly very difficult. Stutzer and Lalive (2004) propose 
capturing the strength of belief that people should earn their own income, by using the results 
of a referendum on the level of unemployment benefits. They find that regional differences in 
the duration of unemployment can be connected to voting results, so that the typical social 
norm pattern emerges. The stronger the norm in a certain community, the more people 
conform to it and the shorter the unemployment duration. Moreover, Stutzer and Lalive 
provide further evidence supporting the hypothesis of social pressure on potential norm-
violators, by examining individual well-being. They find that the stronger the norm, the less 
comfortable the state of unemployment. This approach of linking regional differences in 
unemployment-induced unhappiness to different levels of norm compliance and the 
corresponding unemployment figures has also been applied by Clark (2003).
6 Using British 
panel data, his study reveals a positive impact of the unemployment of others on the well-
being of a given unemployed individual. After first replicating this finding for German panel 
data (see Clark et al., 2009), Clark et al. (2010) go a step further, by considering whether the 
dividing line should really be drawn between employed and unemployed individuals. While 
instead, they differentiate between good and poor job prospects, in this paper, the question is 
also raised as to where the line needs to be drawn; but the suggestion offered here is 
significantly different from that of Clark et al. 
                                                 
5 In addition to the studies discussed here, Lindbeck et al. (1999; 2003) also examine the dynamic aspect of the 
social norm against living off benefits and how it interacts with economic and political decisions. 
6 There are further empirical studies from Hedström et al. (2003), as well as from Tolciu (2009). Although they 
refer to the Elster understanding of the social work norm, the focus is also on the regional unemployment 
argument. 
  5The abovementioned studies are investigations of norm-related effects on the well-being of 
unemployed individuals, implying that unemployment entails norm-violation and vice versa. 
While the former is undoubtedly true, the reverse relation does not correspond perfectly with 
the original understanding, which defines norm-violators as those living off other people, not 
necessarily as those who are unemployed. According to Elster’s definition, the social work 
norm requires one to earn income from work and to avoid depending on others. This seems to 
be associated only with being either employed or unemployed, but on closer examination, 
employed individuals also do not conform to a norm that is defined in this manner, when they 
receive additional financial assistance from the state. Therefore, the appropriate distinction 
must be made between people who live off their own income and those who live in benefit-
receiving households, which can explicitly include employed individuals.  
The potential consequence of living off other people is stigmatisation. On further reflection, 
there is not much of a difference between disutility that is caused by the failure to conform to 
the above social norm in the definition of Elster and welfare stigma. Accordingly, research on 
the latter is also relevant here. As a major contributor, Moffitt (1983) finds that welfare stigma 
is constant with respect to income levels, so that the disutility effect results from the mere fact 
of receiving transfer payments. Against this background, in the empirical investigation, it is 
therefore reasonable to distinguish simply between those who receive benefits, thus violating 
the social work norm, and those who not. However, by contrast, Moffitt (1981; 1983) argues 
that the welfare stigma is not constant over different social programs, so that benefits can 
indeed be more or less stigmatising. This is highly relevant to an analysis of the social work 
norm, since the receipt of a certain payment may, in one case, be regarded as “living off other 
people,” while in another case, one may feel perfectly entitled to do so. Furthermore, the issue 
of stigma and how to avoid it is an aspect of some research on labour market concepts. 
Feist  and Schöb (1998, p.  465), for instance, discuss the issue of workfare and expect a 
“reduction in stigmatization” from temporary employment for otherwise unemployed 
individuals.
7 On closer inspection, they refer to the disutility that is generally caused by 
unemployment, which should be distinguished here from the isolated psychological impact of 
living off public funds. Since the argument of reduced stigma would come to nothing if 
stigmatisation, as a jobless person, is similar to that encountered by a person living off public 
                                                 
7 In addition, Besley and Coate (1992) also expect the concept of workfare to be less stigmatising than pure 
welfare, because when recipients have to supply their labour, the misuse of welfare becomes unattractive to non-
needy people. Moffitt (1983, p. 1034) asks whether a negative income tax would be less stigmatising than the 
existing system in the United States, by referring to Samuelson’s introductory words in his standard textbook on 
economics. Furthermore, Elster (1988, p. 75) discusses how certain kinds of direct payments can lead to negative 
reactions, so that people “resist being subsidized in ways that make it obvious that they do not make any 
productive contribution.” On this issue, see also Andrade (2002, p. 306). 
  6funds, a comparison of both effects is a promising basis for a novel perspective on such labour 
market concepts.  
Most of the studies on welfare stigma derive their findings from investigations of non-take-up 
rates, which are certainly determined in part by stigma, but not completely.
8 Despite the 
obvious measurement problems of such empirical approach, the notion of using happiness 
data to investigate welfare stigma is applied only sporadically. An exception is a study on 
potential stigma effects from the receipt of income support payments, finding no significant 
well-being impact on Australian youths (Lee and Oguzoglu, 2007). By contrast, the empirical 
investigation presented below measures the general well-being impact on adult individuals of 
living off others. This potential disutility effect is then investigated further according to the 
above research objectives. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
The data used in the present investigation is from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP).
9 In the SOEP questionnaire, respondents evaluate their general life satisfaction level 
on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 10, which then can be used as a proxy for utility levels. 
Concerning the investigation of disutility effects from living off other people, it is necessary 
to establish exactly when this is the case. For instance, as long as it is not means-tested, the 
receipt of child benefits surely does not conflict with the norm of earning one’s income from 
work. In Germany, nearly all parents would otherwise become norm-violators, simply by 
virtue of having children. Therefore, in order to understand which benefits are relevant to the 
present investigation, it is necessary to take a brief look at the German social system. 
In Germany, individuals initially receive benefits called “Arbeitslosengeld” (ALG) from the 
quasi-governmental unemployment insurance, if they become unemployed and the 
requirements are met. Until 2004, unemployed persons received unemployed assistance after 
the limited period of ALG receipts. This follow-up benefit program was subsequently merged 
with the social assistance program into one transfer scheme referred to as ALG2, as part of the 
recent German labour market reforms.
10 Since this package of legislation (the so-called 
                                                 
8 For example, Riphahn (2001) discusses stigma as a potential determinant of the large numbers of eligible 
households in Germany not taking up the financial support available to them. For a general review of relevant 
studies, see Andrade (2002). On the other hand, Smolensky et al. (1995, p. 10) point out that “the effect of 
stigma is difficult to separate from the influence of transaction costs, ignorance, or the researcher's imperfect 
knowledge of eligibility requirements.”  
9 For a description of the SOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
10 In addition, the unemployment insurance benefit ALG was renamed ALG1. For the sake of convenience, 
however, only the term ALG is used in this study. 
  7“Hartz concept”) came into effect fully on January 1
st 2005, ALG2 has assumed the central 
role in the German social system. While eligibility is calculated on a household basis, this 
benefit also targets low-income earners, when household income is below a certain level.
11 
Because of the option of topping up low earnings, ALG2 has, in fact, the abovementioned 
combination component, which allows wages to fall, although a minimum level of income 
(needed to exist) is always guaranteed, if necessary, by additional payments from public 
funds. Other relevant types of social benefits to which households in Germany can be eligible, 
are housing assistance, social assistance
12 and basic protection for the elderly or those with a 
reduced capacity to work. Not only because the latter has only been paid since 2005, there is a 
true break in the data in the wake of the reforms, which must be considered in the empirical 
investigation. Also note that unemployment assistance, as the predecessor of ALG2, was not 
determined on a household, but on an individual basis. However, since most benefits are not 
paid to individuals but to households, the best way to distinguish between those who comply 
with the social work norm, from those who do not, is to compare households. Therefore, the 
group of norm-violators consists of individuals living in households that receive at least one 
of the abovementioned benefits (see Table 1).
13 
The unemployment insurance benefit ALG is not part of the bundle of benefits that are 
classified here as relevant to the social work norm. The reason for this is not only the 
individual calculation (instead of a calculation on a household basis), which took place before 
and after the reforms; it is primarily because of the nature of this benefit. When people receive 
social benefits that are financed by the community, i.e. by “others,” the norm against living 
off other people is violated. Ultimately, this is the case with ALG as well, but because of its 
configuration as a payment from an insurance system, into which the unemployed individual 
has previously contributed on a mandatory basis, it is supposedly perceived differently. While 
recipients of taxpayer-funded welfare benefits, such as social assistance, are typically seen as 
those who are living off others, ALG-benefits are presumably regarded as “citizens’ rights” 
(Lindbeck, 1995, p. 481). If so, people would be less stigmatised and certainly less reluctant 
to live on unemployment insurance benefits. Therefore, there are good reasons to separate 
                                                 
11 The law defines persons as either directly eligible or as part of a so-called “Bedarfsgemeinschaft”, which, in 
order to reduce complexity, is treated here as a regular household. 
12 Since the labour market reforms have been implemented, many employable persons, who would previously 
have been eligible to social assistance, are receiving ALG2, but a small number of households still participate in 
the so-called “Sozialhilfe”. 
13 With regard to the empirical investigation, this means that all members of households with at least one 
recipient of the individually paid unemployment assistance (in the period up to 2005) are treated technically just 
like those in ALG2-receiving households (in the period since 2005). 
  8ALG from the bundle of norm-relevant benefits and to assume a less negative (or maybe even 








For each year and each category, Table  1 gives observation numbers in the SOEP data 
sample, which consists of individuals, aged 18 to 65, and covers the period 1999 to 2008. The 
categories of particular interest in this study are unemployed registered individuals (UNEMP), 
recipients of unemployment insurance (ALG) and those living in households that violate the 
social work norm (SWN). Since unemployed people usually receive some kind of payment, 
the groups inevitably overlap to a great extent. On the other hand, there are also employed 
individuals living in households that receive norm-relevant benefits. Since unemployment-
induced disutility is well documented in the literature, these cases are of particular importance 
in examining norm-induced effects. 
In order to gain an initial impression of the relationship between well-being and the examined 
categories, the corresponding life satisfaction means are also given in Table 1. As found in 
many other studies, the unemployed have a much lower level of well-being, compared to the 
average person (5.71 to 6.99). With an average life satisfaction of 5.98, recipients of ALG are 
slightly better off, even though they are all unemployed.
14 Compared to the mean value for all 
unemployed individuals, recipients of norm-relevant benefits are also better off, having an 
average value of 5.90. The reason for this is surely connected to the fact that this category also 
consists of individuals who are actually employed, and thus potentially happier. In Table 2, 
not only is a distinction made between unemployed and employed individuals, but the latter is 
also divided into people conforming to the social work norm and those living in benefit-
receiving households. In fact, the mean values for life satisfaction support the general finding 
that people are happier with work than without it, but the positive impact of employment 
                                                 
14 There are some observations in the original data sample, where individuals answered “yes” to the question 
about ALG receipts, but denied being unemployed. In this case, a cleansing of the data is certainly useful in 
order to ensure clearness and correctness. The same applies to observations of respondents who said they were 
registered as unemployed, but simultaneously denied being “not employed” (when asked for their employment 
status). Although there are plausible explanations for this, these observations have also been dropped from the 
sample. 
  9seems to be much lower for those living off public funds (average life satisfaction of 6.44), 








Another way of obtaining insights about the relevance of the social work norm is to examine 
changes in labour force status and corresponding well-being changes in a transition matrix. 
With reference to similar studies, such as Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998, p. 6), but 
adapted to the present research objectives, Table  2 presents case numbers and average 
changes in life satisfaction. As expected, taking up employment is associated with a 
significant increase in well-being. However, those who are also living off their own earnings 
become happier, in comparison to employed low-earning individuals who are not. On 
average, the increase in happiness is 0.42 for the latter and 0.75 for those complying with the 
social work norm. More corroborating evidence could be expected from considering 
employed individuals who switch between norm-violation and norm-conformity. While there 
is a significant drop in well-being from becoming dependent on benefits (-0.12), there is no 
significant increase in life satisfaction for employed individuals who stop living off other 
people. However, the insignificant outcome of 0.06 includes information that can be detected 
when the potential structural break is considered. An additional calculation, focusing only on 
transitions since 2005, yields an average increase in life satisfaction of 0.17, which is indeed 
significant. Since these changes in average life satisfaction could also be associated with other 
relevant factors, such as differences in income levels, this study continues with a multiple 
regression analysis, which considers other factors influencing life satisfaction, in order to 
yield isolated relationships. 
One of the most important factors determining well-being is the time-invariant personality 
trait, which results from genetic inheritance (see Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). From a 
methodological perspective, this suggests the use of fixed-effects models that take account of 
these given, but unobservable factors. Although Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have 
shown that the consideration of fixed individual effects is substantial, and likely to be more 
important than the ordinality of the life satisfaction responses, the ordinary least squares 
  10(OLS) method, which assumes cardinality, is supplemented here by the use of the conditional 









Table 3 reports the first set of results from the regression analysis, investigating the social 
work norm in general. In the two middle columns, as always, showing the results for both 
estimation methods, the first major finding is evident. A strongly significant OLS coefficient 
of about -0.101 (and -0.155 in the case of the conditional logit estimator) implies that there is 
indeed an isolated negative impact on life satisfaction from living off public funds. This effect 
exists, when other factors that influence well-being are controlled for, and irrespective of the 
isolated disutility caused by unemployment. The latter effect, on the other hand, is, as 
expected, very large, and also taking account of the results for the first specification, becomes 
slightly smaller when variables for norm-induced effects are included. Hence, the social work 
norm helps to explain why the unemployed are so unhappy, but, since the differences between 
the coefficients are very small (-0.443 to -0.410 in the case of OLS), the negative impact of 
living off other people is obviously not the ultimate cause of unemployment-induced disutility 
found in so many empirical studies. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 3 demonstrate why unemployment insurance benefits (ALG) 
should be considered separately. While there is a strongly significant impact in the case of the 
other benefits, neither of the two estimation methods yields a significant effect on 
unemployed individuals in the case of ALG receipts. In the third specification, which uses 
variables for the interaction (IA) with three age categories, different patterns can be detected. 
While unemployment-induced utility decreases with age, an inverse relationship emerges with 
respect to the impact of the social work norm. On the other hand, no such pattern can be 
found for recipients of ALG. Moreover, ALG generally does not mitigate the unhappiness 
                                                 
15 This method requires the transformation of the ordinal happiness variable into binary format. Therefore, a 
fixed threshold is needed. Throughout the empirical investigation, observations with a life satisfaction score of 
more than 7 are “happy”, while accordingly, the other scores are combined to form the category “unhappy”. 
Regarding the use of logit estimations, economists researching happiness, such as Clark et al. (2009, p. 257) are 
increasingly aware of a potential problem which was generally introduced in the methodological discussion by 
Ai and Norton (2003) and may arise from using interaction variables. While this certainly needs to be considered 
when interpreting the results, the use of two estimation methods reduces the impact of such problems. 
  11caused by unemployment. For individuals younger than 30, the logit results even indicate a 
marginally significant increase in the probability of being additionally unhappy, presumably 
because ALG is generally less rewarding for people with fewer years of compulsory 
coverage. Taking account of this general insignificance, the issue of ALG receipts is not part 









While some preliminary evidence of normative pressure on employed individuals to earn a 
living is given by the transition matrix, the first specification presented in Table 4 reveals the 
isolated disutility impact of living off other people, specifically for those who are employed. 
For both estimation methods, the negative coefficients representing the interaction between 
norm-violation and employment are significant at the 5 % level. This indicates that eligibility 
for benefits, resulting logically from earning very little, makes employed people unhappy, 
irrespective of the general effect of income, which is routinely controlled for. On the other 
hand, this disutility effect (-0.072 and -0.140 respectively) is again far smaller than that 
caused by unemployment. In the next specification, the effect for norm-violating people is 
divided further into full-time and part-time employment. The results show that the interaction 
between part-time employment and benefit receipts reduces well-being significantly, while 
the corresponding estimates for full-time employment are insignificant. With reference to the 
political debate in Germany, this latter finding is rather remarkable, clearly warranting further 
investigation, particularly taking into account potential effects related to labour market 
policies. 
                                                 
16 In order to identify any positive effect of ALG receipts, the sample could be restricted to Germans only. 
Further regressions, which are not presented here, show that people without German nationality do not seem to 
be affected similarly by the above insurance argument, so that separate calculations for this group yield 
significantly negative outcomes.  
Another promising object of examination is education, which yields two distinct patterns. The negative impact of 
unemployment increases with increasing education, while there is a countering compensation effect of ALG 
receipts. This is quite plausible, since ALG is typically more rewarding for people with higher education, and 
thus higher income levels. Remarkably, for this latter group, the social work norm effect is not very significant, 
while people with average education levels suffer the most. This could be interpreted as meaning that the typical 
working class is affected most by a social norm effect. Another explanation could be non-take-up, which is to be 
expected from people who can afford it. 
  12It is important to note that the assumption of a structural break in 2005 is based on technical 
considerations. As discussed above, some benefit programs were introduced in 2005, while 
others were modified fundamentally at that time. On the other hand, a psychological effect 
may be associated with the implementation of reforms, which could have outweighed the 
technical implications. For instance, over the course of the political debate, German citizens 
could have changed their views on such issues as how important it is to earn one’s own 
income. In Tables 3 and 4, the results of a general structural break (SB) in the impact of living 
in a benefit-receiving household indicate an additional negative, but insignificant effect. 
Although, at first glance, it seems that there is no break with regard to the impact of living off 
others, this could also be the result of countering effects for different sub-categories, so that 
the model is in fact specified inappropriately. The findings from the transition matrix, which 
indicate a structural break, suggest splitting up the group of norm-violators, according to their 
employment status. Indeed, the extended specification, presented in the last two columns of 
Table 4, yields further remarkable outcomes. For the period since 2005, there is a significant 
disutility effect for those in full-time employment, who do not conform to the social work 
norm. Furthermore, unemployed individuals in benefit-receiving households experience an 
additional effect in the period since 2005, which counters the generally negative impact of 
living off other people. While, at least in the OLS regressions, the interaction between norm-
violation and unemployment is generally significantly negative, this normative pressure to 
earn one’s own living seems to have declined since the implementation of the policy reforms. 
However, this counter-effect is not significant, at least not in this specification. 
In order to confirm the findings further, Table 5 offers a different method of examining the 
interaction between employment status and potential norm-effects. Instead of using 
interaction variables, the data sample is reduced to certain groups of individuals. Indeed, the 
results for people in full-time and part-time employment confirm the previous insights, while 
the outcomes for the group of unemployed individuals are even more striking. In this 
specification, the negative impact of living off other people is overcompensated by a 
significant counter-effect related to the structural break in 2005. Hence, the social work norm 
effect, that is, the normative pressure on unemployed individuals to earn income from work, 
has changed considerably in its impact on people’s well-being over the course of the labour 
market reforms.
17  
                                                 
17 This conclusion of a psychologically, rather than a technically determined structural break, is supported by 
further regressions, using 2004 as the year of change and yielding fairly similar outcomes. Since the political 
debate on the labour market reforms commenced well before their actual implementation, the psychological 
impact on affected well-being can be found for the previous year as well (see Chadi, 2010).  
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Some critical remarks on the informative value of the empirical results are worth making, 
before they are discussed further and interpreted in order to derive policy recommendations. 
The main objective of the study, of proving the relevance of the social work norm, is achieved 
by the use of information about benefit receipts at the household level. Thus, there are not just 
eligible individuals, but members of households categorised as norm-violators. Accordingly, 
this group is certainly not homogeneous and one could object to the underlying assumption 
that the corresponding estimates express a constant individual norm-induced disutility effect. 
Some members of benefit-receiving households may be unreceptive to any kind of norm, 
although they are also targeted by the calculations. A measured disutility effect might then be 
triggered by other causes, which is, in fact, a general problem when negative coefficients are 
interpreted as evidence of a norm effect.  
To begin with, legal circumstances compel investigating at the household level, as described 
above. More importantly, however, the separation of the heterogeneous norm-violators into 
various sub-categories, in order to isolate the effects of living off others, helps to mitigate the 
potential problem of focusing on the wrong people. For instance, the outcomes for the 
category of full-time employment correctly represent the disutility effects on individuals who 
are not earning enough from work for their household to lose its eligibility for benefits. On the 
other hand, potential symptoms that could be expected in socially disadvantaged households, 
such as a lower standard of health, are captured mainly by the broad set of control variables, 
so that the problem of measuring the impact of something other than that which was intended, 
is also mitigated.
18 
Moreover, the outcomes not only accurately demonstrate the well-being effect of not 
conforming to the social work norm, there is a strong argument suggesting that the impact of 
norm-violation is actually understated. As mentioned in Section  2, researchers identify 
                                                 
18 One might argue that there are non-pecuniary symptoms, such as general adversity, which are not 
ascertainable through the panel interviews. However, further tests using separate measures for the different 
benefits tend to refute this notion. Members of households that receive social assistance would be expected to be 
worse off, compared to those receiving other benefits, but the results yield comparatively weak effects. 
  14stigmatisation as one reason for the non-take-up of social benefits, which many studies have 
revealed to be a relevant empirical phenomenon. Accordingly, individuals with a particularly 
marked reluctance to live off other people, certainly try to avoid receiving benefits. In this 
case, however, these eligible persons, who are actually affected strongly by the norm, are not 
part of the examined group. Because, instead, they are part of those categorised as norm-
conformers, a self-selection bias, attenuating the calculated norm effect, must be expected. 
Therefore, even seemingly small effects can be regarded as evidence of the relevance of the 
social work norm, since the coefficients cannot capture the entire impact.
19 
4. Discussion 
The empirical results demonstrate that the social work norm is more than just a theoretical 
construct and that there is every reason to consider norm-effects, not only in labour market 
economics, but in policy-making as well. Especially in constructing labour market concepts 
that are based on supplementing low-paid jobs with additional benefits, it is imperative to take 
account of such a norm, because it is clearly not the case that income is just income. All in all, 
however, norm-induced disutility caused by the failure to earn one’s own income, is not the 
major reason why the unemployed are so unhappy. In this regard, the social work norm has 
only limited explanatory power, so that unemployment-induced unhappiness is obviously 
determined mainly by other factors. Therefore, it must be concluded that individuals are 
generally better off being employed rather than unemployed, even when in the former case the 
norm against living off public funds is violated. Yet, from a policy perspective, this major 
finding is certainly not sufficient to fully assess large-scale programs like the German Hartz 
concept, although it might be reason enough for the staunch proponents. In fact, it is generally 
true for one individual, that it is better to be employed and subsidised by additional benefits, 
than it is to be unemployed. However, other relevant effects of instruments aimed at bringing 
unemployed individuals into subsidised employment must be considered as well. 
First, it is important to note that not everyone who has a low-paid job and is eligible for social 
benefits would otherwise be unemployed. An increase in size of the low-wage sector will not 
thus produce only profiteers, but also people who are worse off. From the findings of this 
study, it can be concluded that such low-income earners would at least suffer from failing to 
conform to the social work norm. In addition, the regression results indicate changes in the 
                                                 
19 As mentioned in Footnote 16, further estimations yield surprisingly small effects on highly educated people. 
Assuming that higher education is associated with higher wealth, so that there is no basic need for replacement 
income, this group of people may indeed be particularly receptive to non-take-up. 
  15impact of norm-violation, due to the implemented policies. In the economic literature, it is 
argued that various factors potentially determine norm strength, i.e. norms might change at 
least in the medium term. As described above, the determinant is located mainly in regional 
communities, but there are many other potential “norm senders” (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006, 
p. 1474), such as legislation. In the present paper, it is argued that social norms generally 
exist, but it is the level of conformity that changes, so that, at different periods of time (e.g. 
before and after significant legislative changes) or in different regions (as investigated in other 
studies) individuals have different motivations to follow such an informal rule and 
accordingly are sometimes more, and sometimes less concerned about norm-violation. The 
empirical results show that, since the implementation of the policy reforms, the significant 
disutility effect of living off other people has at least been reduced for the unemployed. 
Probably reinforced by the political debate, this reduction in normative pressure on the 
unemployed to earn their income from work, can certainly be linked to the policies designed 
to make benefit receipts more common, through promoting subsidised low-wage jobs. Since 
non-governmental institutions, such as unions, may also act as norm senders, it is interesting 
to note that, in the political debate in Germany, the argument has routinely been brought 
forward, that it is not right to have full-time workers in need of social benefits. The results 
indicate that, since it is being discussed publicly, the combination of full-time employment 
and benefit receipts has indeed a negative connotation, as if a self-fulfilling prophecy has 
come true. 
Regarding the assessment of labour market policies, the identification of the various impacts 
on well-being is certainly important, but, in order to draw useful conclusions, it is necessary 
first to know which utility impacts are desirable and which are not. One might argue that, if 
people suffer from something, it should be opposed. Motivation, on the other hand, even if the 
result of dissatisfaction, could be regarded as socially beneficial, especially when it is about 
terminating unemployment and avoiding benefit receipts.
20 Social norms encouraging such 
behaviour are attractive, at least from a fiscal point of view, when governments would 
otherwise have to spend large amounts of money to create identical incentives. In addition, 
research on intrinsic motivation has identified further problems of extrinsic pecuniary 
incentive schemes (see Frey and Jegen, 2001). Hence, there are good reasons for a society to 
foster social norms, although norm-violators may suffer from stigmatisation. On the other 
hand, norms may lose their relevance or power over time. For example, changing economic 
                                                 
20 A very similar debate on the potential advantages of stigma can be found in the economic literature. For 
instance, Smolensky et al. (1995, p. 10) discuss “how much we should worry about it.”  
  16conditions may make it difficult or even impossible for people to comply with a particular 
social norm, so that adherence might even become obsolete. 
Although hard to achieve in practice, ideally, there is considerable societal consensus as to the 
social norms that should prevail. Applied to the issue of labour market policies, there are two 
distinct paths. One is that wages are above the subsistence level and people are pressured by a 
broadly accepted social norm to earn their income from work. For the second path, where 
there is a significant low-wage sector, there is no real benefit from a social work norm as 
defined here. If a large low-wage sector is not regarded as a social problem, but as something 
that is inevitable or even desirable, then there is a need for concepts that combine low-paid 
employment and additional governmental support. These payments for eligible persons should 
then have no stigma attached, if policies aim at increasing happiness and approval among 
citizens. The empirical results for the receipt of the unemployment insurance benefits of ALG 
indicate that a stigma is not necessarily associated with benefit programs. Accordingly, with 
regard to both the acceptance and success of labour market concepts, this study suggests the 
appropriateness of payments that appear as earned income, as something to which one is 
entitled, so that people do not suffer from the perception that they are living off other people. 
However, if a society is opposed to a low-wage strategy and urges policy-makers to combat or 
reduce the low-wage sector, instead of promoting it, the policy advice is accordingly different. 
Moreover, when people agree on a common behavioural rule, that it is the duty of all citizens 
to earn their own living, this belief should be cultivated not only by policy-makers, but by 
society in general. In this context, Fehr and Falk (2002, p. 711) examine a “management of 
social norms” and discuss how norm-guided behaviour can be enforced. For instance, they 
argue in favour of clarity with regard to the messages conveyed by the implemented incentive 
scheme. Applied to the matter on hand, labour market policies should then all the more target 
the creation of jobs above subsistence levels, through, for example, implementing union-
friendly legislation, insofar as this is the preferred path. 
5. Conclusions and Further Research 
The empirical investigation of the social work norm and its normative pressure to earn one’s 
own income leads to a series of significant policy recommendations. First, people in Germany 
suffer substantially from living off public funds. Since this norm-violation also affects people 
in employment, economists and policy-makers need to consider this issue, especially in 
connection with labour market concepts for low-wage sectors. On the other hand, the study 
  17also demonstrates that the main problem is not disutility from living off other people, but 
from unemployment itself. Therefore, the results generally support those who promote 
policies aimed at bringing the unemployed into (low-paid) employment, even if, in some 
cases, households need to be subsidised from public funds. Moreover, underlined by 
theoretical arguments and the empirical findings, stigmatisation is neither a given, nor an 
unavoidable problem inevitably associated with benefit receipts, so that this potential side-
effect can be addressed effectively.  
As pointed out in the discussion, there are essentially two paths for the development of 
national labour markets. Assuming that this development is capable of being influenced, 
policies should either promote the creation of jobs with wages above subsistence levels, in 
order to allow as many people as possible to live entirely off their own earnings, or pursue a 
low-wage strategy, aimed at stimulating labour demand and increasing overall employment. 
In this case, governmental transfers to low-wage earners should be free of stigma and norm-
induced disutility effects, so that dissatisfaction and disaffirmation in the population is 
prevented as much as possible. If, however, policy-makers ignore these issues, the 
consequences may be unhappiness among employed workers, who suffer from the 
stigmatisation of being partly dependent on social benefits, while on the other hand, the 
normative pressure on unemployed individuals might decline, due to potentially increasing 
numbers of people receiving benefits.  
Due to space limitations, the present discussion does not delve further into the complex issue 
of unemployment and its determinants, nor does it consider whether large low-wage sectors 
are an unavoidable phenomenon. Yet, what does seem clear is that, whatever path is chosen, 
even if it is not derived from a social consensus, it should at least be pursued consistently. In 
Germany, the government planned to tackle unemployment by increasing the number of low-
qualified jobs, thus promoting a low-wage sector that involves an option of additional benefits 
for those earning less than the subsistence level. However, the issues discussed here have 
largely been ignored, so that receiving benefits is indeed perceived as a stigma for employed 
people, in contrast to unemployed people. Therefore, the German example demonstrates the 
potential consequences of disregarding relevant factors, which has certainly not contributed to 
increasing the acceptance and overall success of the implemented labour market policies.  
The development of promising labour market models that consider such issues as norm-
guided behaviour and stigmatisation is a task for economic researchers. In some cases, these 
aspects have already been considered, which will hopefully be expanded and extended by 
further theoretical and empirical research on labour market concepts. There are various vital 
  18issues to investigate, such as whether negative income taxes are indeed less stigmatising than 
regular social benefits. It is highly relevant to policy-makers to determine how models such as 
workfare actually affect people, and not only the unemployment statistics. Moreover, it is to 
be hoped that further research will also consider the potential dynamics associated with social 
norms. Since the level of adherence to such norms is determined by various factors, there is a 
clear need for theoretical and empirical research in this area. A meaningful and useful 
investigation of the development of norm-conformity and the changing impact of social 
norms over time may require long data sets, but these will become increasingly available in 
the near future. 
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Observation Numbers and General Life Satisfaction for Each Category 
      
Year  Number of Observations 
 UNEMP  ALG  SWN  EMPLOYED  ALL 
1999 908  443  1,059  7,392  11,448 
2000 1,401  598  1,601  12,304  19,249 
2001 1,295  549  1,368  11,289  17,584 
2002 1,314  588  1,315  12,379  18,895 
2003 1,385  617  1,385  11,335  17,514 
2004 1,377  589  1,497  10,932  16,837 
2005 1,326  512  1,484  10,410  16,006 
2006 1,408  463  1,773  10,859  16,699 
2007 1,144  321  1,487  10,440  15,524 
2008 946  260  1,287  9,930  14,421 
      
mean  happiness  5.71 5.98 5.90 7.13 6.99 
standard  error  0.018 0.029 0.017 0.005 0.004 
N  12,504 4,940 14,256  107,270  164,177 
       
Explanation of the categories:         
UNEMP  individuals who are registered as unemployed 
ALG  unemployed individuals who receive unemployment insurance benefits ALG 
(“Arbeitslosengeld”* or “Arbeitslosengeld 1”**)   
SWN  individuals living in households, in which at least one individual or the entire 
household receives one of the following as norm-related identified benefits: 
- unemployment assistance (“Arbeitslosenhilfe”*) 
- ALG2 (“Arbeitslosengeld 2”**) 
- social assistance (“Sozialhilfe“) 
- housing assistance (“Wohngeld“) 
- basic protection for the elderly or those with a reduced capacity to work 
(“Grundsicherung im Alter und bei Erwerbsminderung”**)  
EMPLOYED  individuals in full-time or in part-time employment, including regular and marginal 
or irregular employment 
* denotes period from 1999 to 2004; **denotes period from 2005 to 2008. 
Data: SOEP waves from 1999 to 2008 with individuals, aged 18 to 65 
      
 
 





  Table 2  
Transition Matrix: Change in Life Satisfaction by Labour Force Status 
    
  Labour Force Status at t   
       
Labour Force Status 
at t – 1 
I. Employed, 
conforming to the 
social work norm 
II. Employed, 
living in a household
receiving payments
III. Unemployed  
     
       
I. Employed, 
conforming to the 
social work norm 
- 0.06  - 0.12  - 0.67  mean changes 
0.005 0.051  0.040  standard  error 
75,472 1,136 2,451  N 
      
II. Employed, 
living in a household 
receiving payments 
0.06  - 0.07  - 0.55  mean changes 
0.047 0.045  0.113  standard  error 
1,297 1,261 295  N 
      
III. Unemployed  0.75  0.42  - 0.07  mean changes 
0.043 0.109  0.026  standard  error 
2,055 313  5,599  N 
        
        
 7.15  6.44  5.71  mean  happiness 
0.005 0.028  0.018  standard  error 
103,396 3,874 12,504  N 
 
Notes: Classification of categories in accordance with explanations in Table 1 
I.  Employed, conforming to the social work norm: SWN = 0 & EMPLOYED = 1 
 1 
= 1 
II.  Employed, living in a household receiving payments: SWN = 1 & EMPLOYED =
III.  Unemployed: UNEMP 
Data: SOEP waves from 1999 to 2008 with individuals, aged 18 to 65 











Well-Being and the Social Work Norm: Basic Models 
        
  Specification (1)  Specification (2)  Specification (3) 
  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT 
        
Unemployed  - 0.443***  - 0.600***  - 0.410***  - 0.525***     
  (0.024) (0.044) (0.030) (0.057)    
IA1 (unemployed, 
  age: 18 to 29) 
    -  0.552***  -  0.680*** 
    (0.060)  (0.095) 
IA2 (unemployed, 
  age: 30 to 49) 
    -  0.464***  -  0.614*** 
    (0.044)  (0.087) 
IA3 (unemployed, 
  age: 50 to 65) 
    -  0.215***  -  0.182* 
    (0.048)  (0.105) 
ALG      - 0.019  - 0.076     
    (0.034)  (0.069)    
IA4 (ALG, 
  age: 18 to 29) 
    -  0.086  -  0.240* 
    (0.076)  (0.132) 
IA5 (ALG, 
  age: 30 to 49) 
    -  0.001  -  0.032 
    (0.052)  (0.110) 
IA6 (ALG, 
  age: 50 to 65) 
    -  0.063  -  0.155 
    (0.055)  (0.123) 
SWN      - 0.101***  - 0.155***     
    (0.025)  (0.048)    
IA7 (SWN, 
  age: 18 to 29) 
    -  0.066*  -  0.048 
    (0.039)  (0.070) 
IA8 (SWN, 
  age: 30 to 49) 
    -  0.113***  -  0.187*** 
    (0.033)  (0.065) 
IA9 (SWN, 
  age: 50 to 65) 
    -  0.134***  -  0.323*** 
    (0.043)  (0.095) 
SB (SWN, 2005)      - 0.031  - 0.088  - 0.031  - 0.076 
      (0.033) (0.064) (0.033) (0.064) 
        
Wave  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  164,177 105,841 164,177 105,841 164,177 105,841 
Adj./  Pseudo  R²  0.116 0.082 0.116 0.082 0.117 0.083 
        
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Controls 
include variables for state-level unemployment rates, employment status, marital status, number of 
children, health, age, German nationality and personal income level. 
Data: SOEP waves from 1999 to 2008 with individuals, aged 18 to 65 
        
 
 






Well-Being and the Social Work Norm: Employment Status 
        
  Specification (1)  Specification (2)  Specification (3) 
  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT 
        
Unemployed  - 0.421***  - 0.560***  - 0.423***  - 0.561***  - 0.425***  - 0.563*** 
  (0.039) (0.072) (0.039) (0.072) (0.039) (0.072) 
        
IA1 (SWN, 
  unemployed) 
- 0.093**  - 0.105  - 0.096**  - 0.109  - 0.141***  - 0.215** 
(0.044) (0.086) (0.044) (0.086) (0.047) (0.094) 
IA2 (SWN, 
  employed) 
- 0.072**  - 0.140**         
(0.031)  (0.064)      
IA3 (SWN, 
  full-time)  
      0.018  - 0.077    0.055    0.019 
    (0.035) (0.074) (0.038) (0.085) 
IA4 (SWN, 
  part-time) 
    - 0.262***  - 0.277***  - 0.235***  - 0.149 
    (0.053) (0.104) (0.066) (0.128) 
IA5 (SWN, 
  rest) 
- 0.143***  - 0.200***  - 0.152***  - 0.207***  - 0.116***  - 0.212*** 
(0.037) (0.068) (0.037) (0.068) (0.042) (0.077) 
        
SB (SWN, 2005)  - 0.033  - 0.093  - 0.028  - 0.089     
 (0.033)  (0.064)  (0.033)  (0.064)     
SB (IA1, 2005)            0.071    0.140 
         (0.050)  (0.102) 
SB (IA3, 2005)          - 0.122**  - 0.341*** 
         (0.061)  (0.130) 
SB (IA4, 2005)          - 0.080  - 0.375** 
         (0.092)  (0.180) 
SB (IA5, 2005)          - 0.117*  - 0.072 
         (0.061)  (0.113) 
        
Wave  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  164,177 105,841 164,177 105,841 164,177 105,841 
Adj./  Pseudo  R²  0.116 0.082 0.116 0.082 0.117 0.082 
        
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Controls 
include variables for state-level unemployment rates, employment status, marital status, number of 
children, health, age, German nationality and personal income level.  
Data: SOEP waves from 1999 to 2008 with individuals, aged 18 to 65 


















Well-Being and the Social Work Norm: Restricted Samples 
        
Restricted to:  Full-time employed  Part-time employed  Unemployed 
  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT  OLS FE  C LOGIT 
        
Marginal, irregular 
  part-time 
    - 0.063*  - 0.051     
  (0.034)  (0.075)    
SWN    0.060    0.043  - 0.357***  - 0.283*  - 0.105*  - 0.267** 
  (0.040) (0.095) (0.082) (0.166) (0.056) (0.135) 
SB (SWN, 2005)  - 0.125**  - 0.369***    0.083  - 0.120    0.208**    0.494** 
  (0.063) (0.143) (0.109) (0.228) (0.086) (0.193) 
        
Wave  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  80,907 49,899 26,363 13,783 12,504  3,291 
Adj./  Pseudo  R²  0.106 0.081 0.096 0.077 0.072 0.075 
        
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Controls 
include variables for state-level unemployment rates, marital status, number of children, health, age, 
German nationality and personal income level.  
Data: SOEP waves from 1999 to 2008 with individuals, aged 18 to 65 
        
 
 
 
 
 